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Abstract
Effective biosecurity is necessary to protect nations and their citizens from a variety of
threats, including emerging infectious diseases, agricultural or environmental pests and
pathogens, and illegal wildlife trade. The physical pathways by which these threats are
transported internationally, predominantly shipping and air traffic, have undergone signifi-
cant growth and changes in spatial distributions in recent decades. An understanding of the
specific pathways and donor-traffic hotspots created by this integrated physical transport
network is vital for the development of effective biosecurity strategies into the future. In this
study, we analysed the physical transport network into Australia over the period 1999–
2012. Seaborne and air traffic were weighted to calculate a “weighted cumulative impact”
score for each source region worldwide, each year. High risk source regions, and those
source regions that underwent substantial changes in risk over the study period, were deter-
mined. An overall risk ranking was calculated by integrating across all possible weighting
combinations. The source regions having greatest overall physical connectedness with
Australia were Singapore, which is a global transport hub, and the North Island of New Zea-
land, a close regional trading partner with Australia. Both those regions with large amounts
of traffic across multiple vectors (e.g., Hong Kong), and those with high levels of traffic of
only one type (e.g., Bali, Indonesia with respect to passenger flights), were represented
among high risk source regions. These data provide a baseline model for the transport of
individuals and commodities against which the effectiveness of biosecurity controls may be
assessed, and are a valuable tool in the development of future biosecurity policy.
Introduction
The international transport of people and goods poses significant border security risks: trans-
mission of infectious diseases [1, 2], individuals and commodities associated with transnational
crime or terrorism [3], and threats to food security (agricultural pests or pathogens) or the
environment [2, 4]. Trade, and associated airborne and seaborne traffic occurs on a global
scale, and has increased in volume over recent decades. To effectively assign border security
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effort and manage risks, it is necessary to quantify physical connectedness between regions on
a global scale, to identify transport-risk hotspots and variations over time. As invasion biolo-
gists, we approach border security and physical connectedness with the primary motivation of
enhancing biosecurity protection, and, as such, much of this manuscript will come from this
perspective.
Biological invasions present significant environmental and economic costs when invasive
species become established outside their native geographic ranges [5, 6]. Global growth in
transnational air travel and seaborne trade has played a significant role in increasing the rates
of biological invasions [7], through aiding movement across natural geographic barriers at his-
torically unprecedented rates [8, 9]. Human-mediated physical transport networks facilitate
the introduction of alien species through a variety of pathways and means [10], which we
group into three key categories: (i) intentional transport including trade and illicit smuggling,
(ii) unintentional stowaways, and (iii) accidental transport alongside a commodity. Intentional
transport (including illicit smuggling) of species and their subsequent release or escape contrib-
utes significantly to alien species introduction, e.g., the global pet trade in slider turtles has
resulted in introductions in at least 73 countries worldwide [11]. Unintentional transport of
stowaways has resulted in the introduction of over 500 exotic terrestrial plant and animal spe-
cies globally [7], and rising volumes of ballast discharge associated with shipping traffic has
been identified as the primary driver of marine invasions [12]. The third major pathway is acci-
dental introduction alongside a commodity, e.g., pathogens and insect pests associated with
host plants [7, 13]. The importation of timber products represents an extreme threat to the bio-
security of all forested countries, with historical quarantine data identifying large numbers of
insect pests being detected in the transportation and trade of wood products [14, 15]. Interna-
tional trade in ornamental plants has accounted for the majority of insect invasions in Europe
[16]. Increased pest interception rates have also been related to incoming air traffic volumes
into the United States [17].
The establishment phase of the invasion framework (sensu Blackburn [18]) has been subject
to the most research attention [19]. Many examples exist linking invasion events to particular
pathways, however few studies have considered physical transport connectedness between
regions over multiple pathways [9]. Targeted analyses of sea or air traffic have been performed
independently (e.g., [20–23]), but very few studies have considered both air and seaborne traf-
fic concurrently, and these have been primarily linked to disease vector dispersal (e.g., [24,
25]). Variations in traffic volumes across transport pathways makes combined traffic analysis
complex, but determining common features is necessary for effective comparison between
pathways [9]. Worldwide air passenger traffic has grown by nearly 9% per year since 1960,
greater than twice the rate at which global average GDP has grown. Similar growth has also
occurred in airfreight traffic [26]. Approximately 90% of total world trade, by volume, is car-
ried by sea [27]. In 2012, 9.2 billion tonnes of goods were loaded in ports worldwide, compared
to 8.8 billion tonnes in 2011, again exceeding the rate of global average GDP growth [28].
Given these increasing trends in sea and air traffic volumes, there is a growing need to deter-
mine specific pathways and donor-risk hotspots based on a combination of different forms of
transport, providing vital information for the development of effective biosecurity strategies
into the future.
Here, we use Australia as a case study for the analysis of the physical transport network,
with respect to biosecurity surveillance and planning. Border biosecurity and biosurveillance
schemes in Australia are often considered among the most stringent in the world [29], and an
example of international best practice [30]. Australia is the world’s largest continental island
and is uniquely isolated from land-based biosecurity incursion threats and biological invasions.
Yet, even among widespread conspicuous taxa (e.g., alien vertebrates) new post-border
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incursions have continued to increase in the recent decade [31]. With air and seaborne traffic
into Australia constantly increasing, invasion risk is likely to concomitantly increase, and bio-
security policy, directed towards reducing this risk, is of primary concern [30]. International
passenger traffic into Australia increased by 71.2% between 2004 and 2014 [32]. Shipping traf-
fic into Australia has increased significantly between 1999 and 2012, with the annual number
of vessel arrivals increasing by more than 60%, and the average size of vessels also increasing
[20]. Our findings will directly advance the understanding of the transport stage in the invasion
pathway, and inform Government quarantine planning and prevention strategies to mitigate
future alien species impacts through implementation of a risk-based approach to biosecurity
management [33].
Effective monitoring and risk assessments are key components of biosecurity policy [30].
The individual importance of different transport pathways is likely to vary temporally, spa-
tially, and by context (i.e., across taxa in an invasion context, between different pathogens in an
infectious disease context, etc.), and thus it is important to have a flexible framework for quan-
tifying physical connectedness between regions and identifying transport risk hotspots. In this
study we have developed a framework, and associated online tool, which allows managers and
policy makers to compare risk profiles and identify transport-source hotspots through priori-
tising shipping traffic and air traffic in different ways. We also determine an overall hotspot
ranking for transport source regions into Australia, by integrating over the complete range of
voyage risk weightings, and highlight changes in physical transport patterns over time (and
associated changes in biosecurity risk). This framework provides an assessment of the strength
of physical connectedness between regions. In an invasive species context, we envisage that the
Australian case study will inform risk-based biosecurity processes as mandated in the Austra-
lian Government Biosecurity Act 2015, and assist with cost effective assignment of biosecurity
effort.
Methods
For physical international transport into Australia we obtained (1) shipping data from the Aus-
tralian Government Department of Agriculture (formerly the Department of Agriculture, Fish-
eries and Forestry), and (2) flight information data from OAG Aviation (www.oag.com), over
the time period 1999–2012. These data comprised a total of 142070 voyages by sea and
1042807 flights. Flights were separated into predominantly cargo flights (zero recorded passen-
gers), and passenger flights.
Flight data were available at a level aggregated monthly by flight number, i.e., the dataset
recorded, for each flight number visiting an Australian airport from overseas: each airport vis-
ited during the journey, the number of times that journey occurred within the given month,
and the number of seats available for passengers on these flights. Some flight numbers con-
sisted of only a single journey leg (e.g., Auckland to Melbourne), while others consisted of mul-
tiple stopovers (e.g., London to Sydney via Singapore). Specific dates or times on which these
journeys occurred, or plane histories, were not available.
Shipping data included every vessel that travelled to Australia from overseas during the
study period, and the port they visited most recently before travelling to Australia. Vessel his-
tory prior to the most recent port was not available. A detailed analysis of these shipping data,
including types of vessels, ports visited, changes in traffic patterns over time, and associated
ballast water discharge is available in [20].
Each port and airport listed in the flight and shipping datasets was assigned to a geopolitical
region (state/province/territory within each country) within which it was physically located,
using a global spatially referenced geopolitical database in ArcGIS. Some small countries, e.g.,
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Singapore, did not have suitable sub-national units and thus were aggregated at the country
level. Locations of ports and airports were sourced from Lloyds (www.lloydsmiu.com) and
OAG Aviation (www.oag.com) respectively. The geopolitical database was adapted from the
World Administrative Divisions layer package (ESRI 2012), edited to suit the ISO country
naming conventions.
Traffic volumes into Australia from each geopolitical region over each year of the study
period were aggregated. This included number of ships arriving, number of passenger and
cargo planes arriving, and the number of passengers on those passenger flights.
Weighted risk calculation
We constructed a weighted risk metric, so as to combine transport volumes of different voyage
types (i.e., passenger flights, cargo flights, or ship voyages) into a single metric of the relative
risk each donor region presents. We assume that, in a particular context, the risk presented by
each voyage type may be different, e.g., a particular alien species may be more likely to be trans-
ported successfully by air than by sea, due to the difference in journey duration. We also
assumed these relative risks were consistent across all flights or voyages, and not dependent on
the source or destination location. Each voyage type is assigned a weighting: wp for passenger
flights, wc for cargo flights and ws for ship arrivals, and we can then use physical transport data
to rank source regions based on their weighted cumulative impact. These individual weightings
wp, wc and ws encode how much more or less likely one transport type is to be carrying a biose-
curity threat than other transport types. For example, if, on average, we expect a ship to be
three times as likely as a passenger flight to be carrying an alien species, then ws would be three
times wp. The weightings can in practice be any non-negative value, with the most important
factor being their ratios. For ease of interpretation, in this paper we consider primarily cases
with one weighing set to 1, so that the remaining weightings can be interpreted directly as the
number of times more or less likely vessels of other types are to be carrying cargo of biosecurity
concern (e.g., alien species). A weighting of zero would mean that you do not consider that
pathway to contribute any transport risk in the context in question. The weighted cumulative
impact from a given source region is I: = wp × #passenger flights + wc × #cargo flights + ws ×
#ships.
We present two example scenarios under this framework: (1) with equally weighted voyages
wp = wc = ws = 1, and (2) with cargo voyages, particularly ships, weighted relatively highly
(ws> wc>>wp). These two scenarios correspond to passenger flight, and cargo dominated
risk, respectively.
To determine how variation in weightings resulted in variations in the highest risk regions,
we determined the top 5 regions for each combination of weightings with wp = 1 fixed, and wc
and ws each between 0 and 50 (i.e., wc and ws values at each point of a square grid, with grid
size 0.01). For each of these parameter combinations, we also determined the proportion of
total weighted cumulative impact assigned to these top five source regions, to give an idea of
how ‘top heavy’ the rankings are for a given parameter combination. Weightings for which the
top 5 source regions remained consistent were displayed on a ‘phase-change plot’.
Online tool
An online tool was developed using the ‘Shiny’ package [34] in the R statistical programming
environment [35]. Users can choose to view data for transport into Australia in a given year,
and choose weightings for each voyage type (wp, wc, ws). The resulting output is: (1) a map
showing relative risk from each location, (2) a list of the regions providing the most risk, and
(3) a plot indicating how these rankings have changed over time. In the online tool, flights can
Integrative Analysis of the Physical Transport Network into Australia
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0148831 February 16, 2016 4 / 16
be assessed on last port of call, as with the examples in this manuscript, or proportionally over
each previous stop (by flight number), e.g., a single-code flight travelling from London to Syd-
ney via Singapore was either assigned as from Singapore (last port of call) or equally between
London and Singapore. Ship voyages are only able to be assessed from their last port of call
before travelling to Australia.
The tool can be viewed online at: https://robertcope.shinyapps.io/physical_network, and
downloaded as R code from https://github.com/robert-cope/physical_network/.
Overall hotspot ranking
To determine an overall risk ranking for source regions of traffic into Australia, we integrated
rankings across a broad parameter space. We explored the range of parameter space from wp =
wc = ws = 1, to the smallest weighting for each parameter such that the ranking under that
weighting (with the other weightings set to 1) was the same as if that was the only transport
mode considered (i.e., in mathematical terms, the infimum of the set of weightings for which
this is the case). For example, shipping weighting ws ranged from 1, to the value of ws for which
the overall ranking (with wp = wc = 1) was the same as a ranking based entirely on shipping
traffic. The non-uniform parameter ranges were chosen so that the overall ranking assessed the
contributions of each vessel type equally; if the same range was used for each parameter then
passenger flight traffic would dominate as there were many more passenger flights than other
traffic types. The overall score assigned to a source region was I: = wp × #passenger flights + wc
× #cargo flights + ws × #ships (as defined earlier). We explored all unique ratios of parameter
weightings within the parameter space: one weighting choice was set to be equal to 1, and then
10,000 uniformly chosen combinations of the other two weightings were used, and this was
repeated for each choice of fixed weighting for a total of 30,000 points. For each source region,
we recorded their aggregate ranking value, i.e., the highest risk region scores 1, the second high-
est risk region scores 2, etc., and thus the overall highest risk regions were those with minimal
aggregate ranking value (a hypothetical source region that was highest risk at every point
would have cumulative ranking value of 30,000). We also counted the proportion of parameter
values for which a given source region was one of the top 1, 5, 10 or 50 highest risk source
regions.
Results
Example:wp =wc =ws = 1
As a baseline scenario, we considered each voyage type to be weighted equally (i.e., wp = wc =
ws = 1), based on data from 2012. The highest contributing regions were dominated by those
with greatest passenger flight traffic, in particular the North Island of New Zealand, Singapore,
Bali (Indonesia), and Hong Kong (Table 1, Fig 1). Changes in overall ranking between 1999
and 2012 under these weightings were minor. Under this scenario, passenger flight traffic is
overall the most dominant transport type, given that the numbers of passenger flights for high-
traffic regions is much higher than for shipping and cargo flight traffic.
Example:wp = 1,wc = 20,ws = 50
When cargo flights and vessels were weighted highly, with wp = 1, wc = 20 and ws = 50, the rela-
tive rankings of regions differed significantly from the previous equal-weightings scenario.
Regions with high levels of traffic for all three types, including Singapore and the North Island
of New Zealand, remained highly ranked (relative to the wp = wc = ws = 1 rankings), but regions
with few flights and very many cargo ships gained higher ranks, such as Shandong (China)
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(Table 2, Fig 2). In some source regions, there had been a marked change in ranking over the
period 1999–2012, with Shandong (China) moving from 70th to 3rd due to an increase in ship-
ping traffic from 27 vessels in 1999 to 737 vessels in 2012, and similarly Jiangsu (China) from
36th to 5th (67 ship voyages in 1999 to 597 in 2012).
Phase changes & overall trend
The threshold values at which the relative importance of locations switches was calculated for
each pair of locations. The top 5 source regions were the source of c. 60% of all weighted cumu-
lative impact when ws was small, but this decreased to c. 30% as ws increased (Fig 3).
For all combinations of weightings, the total weighted cumulative impact into Australia
across all regions increased between 1999 and 2012. The greatest increases were when only pas-
senger flights had non-zero weights (i.e., wp = 1,wc = ws = 0), with an increase of 93% above
1999 levels. Greater proportional increases occurred with increasing ship weightings than with
increasing cargo flight weightings. Although a few individual regions had extremely large
increases in shipping traffic across the study period, these were counterbalanced by the major-
ity of regions having much smaller changes e.g., with wp = 1,wc = 0,ws = 50, the total weighted
cumulative impact increased by 51% between 1999–2012.
Overall hotspot ranking
We integrated over a range of parameter choices to determine an indication of overall source
region importance. Parameter bounds were chosen to be the minimum value for a given
weighting such that when the other weightings were set to 1, the overall ordering was depen-
dent only on that parameter. The parameter bounds were wp = 68, wc = 1661, and ws = 700.
30,000 parameter weightings were chosen uniformly such that each trio of parameter ratios
was unique. The aggregate rankings of each region were recorded, along with the proportion of
parameter space in which they were among the top 1, 5, 10, or 50 highest risk regions (Table 4).
The highest risk source regions overall were the North Island of New Zealand and Singapore,
sharing the top overall ranking almost equally across the parameter space. Source regions that
had significant representation of all 3 traffic types ranked highly overall, including Hong Kong,
Table 1. Top 10 source regions of air and shipping traffic into Australia during 2012, based on weighted cumulative impact I: =wp × #passenger
flights +wc × #cargo flights +ws × #ships, with equal weightings on each traffic type:wp = 1,wc = 1 andws = 1. ‘1999 rank’ denotes the rank held by
the source region when the same analysis was performed on 1999 traffic data, e.g., under this weighting Hong Kong had third highest I with these weightings
in 1999.
Region passenger ﬂights cargo ﬂights ships weighted cumulative impact (I) 1999 rank
New Zealand—North Island 15546 426 537 16509 1
Singapore 10812 251 1410 12473 2
Indonesia—Bali 6600 0 42 6642 4
Hong Kong 5296 177 342 5815 3
New Zealand—South Island 4762 261 110 5133 5
Malaysia—Selangor 4317 127 105 4549 6
United States—California 3106 0 46 3152 7
Thailand—Samut Prakan 2821 17 3 2841 8
Fiji—Western 2608 0 5 2613 9
Papua New Guinea—Capital District 2193 183 157 2533 11
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148831.t001
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Fig 1. Combined air and sea traffic volume into Australia during 2012, as measured by weighted cumulative impact, I: =wp × #passenger flights +
wc × #cargo flights +ws × #ships. In this example each traffic type is weighted equally:wp = 1,wc = 1 andws = 1. Maps created in R 3.1.0 using geographic
data curated in ArcGIS 10.2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148831.g001
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the South Island of New Zealand, Shanghai (China), Selangor (Malaysia), and the Papua New
Guinea Capital District. Source regions that had very high levels of one particular traffic type,
such as Shandong (China) and Bali (Indonesia), with high levels of shipping and passenger
flights, respectively, were also among the top overall risk hotspots.
Table 2. Top 10 source regions of air and shipping traffic into Australia during 2012, based on weighted cumulative impact I: =wp × #passenger
flights +wc × #cargo flights +ws × #ships, with cargo traffic weighted heavily:wp = 1,wc = 20 andws = 50. ‘1999 rank’ denotes the rank held by the
source region when the same analysis was performed on 1999 traffic data, e.g., under this weighting the Shandong region of China had 70th highest I under
these weightings in 1999.
Region passenger ﬂights cargo ﬂights ships weighted cumulative impact (I) 1999 rank
Singapore_Singapore 10812 251 1410 86332 1
New Zealand_North Island 15546 426 537 50916 2
China_Shandong 737 36850 70
Taiwan (Province of China) 634 613 31284 3
China_Jiangsu 597 29850 36
Hong Kong 5296 177 342 25936 5
Korea (the Republic of)_Jeonranamdo 486 24300 16
China_Shanghai 1557 104 390 23137 26
China_Guangdong 1624 278 15524 18
New Zealand_South Island 4762 261 110 15482 6
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148831.t002
Table 3. The top 5 source regions for physical connectedness into Australia within each section of
weightings phase-space, with groups corresponding to the labels in Fig 3.
A B
New Zealand North Island New Zealand North Island
Singapore Singapore
Indonesia—Bali New Zealand South Island
Hong Kong Hong Kong
New Zealand South Island Malaysia—Selangor
C D
New Zealand North Island Singapore
Singapore New Zealand North Island
New Zealand South Island Hong Kong
Hong Kong Indonesia—Bali
PNG National Capital District China—Shandong
E F
Singapore Singapore
New Zealand North Island New Zealand North Island
Hong Kong Hong Kong
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Fig 2. Combined air and sea traffic volume into Australia during 2012, as measured by weighted cumulative impact, I: =wp × #passenger flights +
wc × #cargo flights +ws × #ships. In this example cargo traffic is weighted heavily:wp = 1,wc = 50 andws = 20. Maps created in R 3.1.0 using geographic
data curated in ArcGIS 10.2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148831.g002
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Discussion
Border security policy urgently requires common frameworks for interpreting and analyzing
risk-based transport of individuals and commodities [36]. We have developed a framework for
comparing physical connectedness between regions based on weighted aggregates of shipping
and air traffic, and demonstrated this framework by using Australia as a case study.
The framework we have developed is novel for three key reasons. First, it combines traffic
volumes across pathways to provide a single comprehensive measure describing the physical
connectedness between geopolitical regions across multiple pathways. Secondly, it uses variable
weightings for each transport pathway, so that the resulting output for a given weighting is eas-
ily customizable to suit a given situation, and the integrated ranking over all weightings fully
encapsulates physical connectedness between regions without making strong assumptions on
the relative contributions of each traffic type. Finally, it allows the assessment of changes in
Fig 3. Phase-change diagram.wp = 1 is fixed. Each line depicts the combination of weights that result in the composition of the top 5 highest risk source
regions changing. Essentially, when moving upwards across a phase-change line, a source region with more cargo flights is entering the top 5, and when
crossing a line towards the right, a source region with more shipping traffic is entering the top 5. Labels correspond to the source region groups in Table 3.
Background colour shows, for a given parameter combination, the proportion of total weighted cumulative impact that originated from the top 5 source
regions in 2012.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148831.g003
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physical connectedness between geopolitical regions over time, which can assist with under-
standing changes in border security risk, and inform effective assignment of border security
effort given these changing conditions.
Quantifying physical connectedness between regions provides useful data for identifying
transport-risk hotspots when presented alone, but may also be effectively combined with other
analyses. For example in an invasion context, if a particular species is of concern, there are a
number of possible complementary approaches: (i) weightings could be chosen to suit the biol-
ogy of the species (e.g., how long it can survive transport; the relevant transport commodities,
etc.); or (ii) regions could be filtered pre- or post-hoc to include only those from which a spe-
cies could be transported. The second approach, however, should be treated with caution, as it
is possible that species may arrive via intermediate locations within which they may not natu-
rally occur. Connectivity could also be combined with measures of environmental similarity to
highlight risk that a transported species could survive in the new location. The flexibility of this
approach means that it may be easily adapted to a range of situations.
The choice of transport mechanism weightings has a significant impact on relative risk
between regions. A number of regions, including most prominently Shandong and Jiangsu
(China), have significant amounts of shipping traffic but very little (or no) air traffic. These
regions would present much higher risk for species capable of surviving the duration of a sea-
borne journey, particularly insects with egg or larval stages [37]. Conversely, there were a few
regions, including Bali (Indonesia) and California (US), with significant amounts of air traffic
but much less seaborne traffic. However, the regions that are likely to be of primary concern
over the broadest range of potential alien species are those with high levels of traffic across all
voyage types. This was demonstrated when rankings were integrated over the full range of
Table 4. Top 20 source regions of air and shipping traffic into Australia in 2012, when rankings were determined by weighted cumulative impact (I:
=wp × #passenger flights +wc × #cargo flights +ws × #ships) integrated over possible values ofwp,wc andws. The aggregate ranking is the sum of
all ranking positions for that source region over 30,000 combinations of parameter values, and the proportions of parameter values for which the source
region is part of the top 1, 5, 10, and 50 ports are also shown.
Region Aggregate ranking Top 1 Top 5 Top 10 Top 50 Passenger Flights Cargo Flights Ships
Singapore—Singapore 45310 49.47 100 100 100 10812 251 1410
New Zealand—North Island 46880 50.53 100 100 100 15546 426 537
Hong Kong 132603 0 81.23 100 100 5296 177 342
New Zealand—South Island 193855 0 65.92 86.74 100 4762 261 110
China—Shanghai 254062 0 0 88.44 100 1557 104 390
Papua New Guinea—National Capital District 290617 0 14.16 66.07 100 2193 183 157
Malaysia—Selangor 299939 0 10.39 62.45 100 4317 127 105
Taiwan (Province of China) 403927 0 29.43 52.27 100 634 0 613
China—Guangdong 434398 0 0 13.32 100 1624 0 278
Japan—Tiba 493813 0 0 0.27 100 1415 0 237
Republic of Korea—Incheon Gwang’yeogsi 602008 0 0 26.12 100 1105 105 62
New Caledonia 629114 0 0 0 100 587 0 229
Indonesia—Bali 635520 0 29.64 53.33 84.03 6600 0 42
China—Shandong 652440 0 41.49 53.99 73.77 0 0 737
China—Fujian 706297 0 0 8.75 95.59 0 105 136
China—Jiangsu 731585 0 17.60 46.71 71.89 0 0 597
Republic of Korea—Jeonranamdo 794900 0 0 31.20 70.53 0 0 486
United States—California 810192 0 0 21 72.67 3106 0 46
Indonesia—Banten 838953 0 0 0 100 881 0 111
United States—Hawaii 902239 0 0 7.12 81.75 933 104 3
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148831.t004
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weighting combinations, and the resulting highest risk regions tend to fit into clear patterns:
the highest risk regions dominated by those with high levels of traffic of all types, including
regions with both key international air hubs and heavy shipping traffic (Singapore, Hong
Kong, Shanghai, Selangor), and regional trade partners (both Islands of New Zealand, PNG
capital district). The remainder of the top 20 source regions (Table 4) consists either of very
high levels of traffic along a single pathway (Passenger flights: Bali, California. Ships: Shan-
dong, Jiangsu, Jeonranamdo), or relatively high traffic levels along two of the three pathways.
We observed that different pathways have been subject to inconsistent increases in traffic vol-
umes over time, with the greatest global increases in volume being in passenger flights. How-
ever, shipping traffic from a number of regions, particularly in China, has increased at a rate
far greater than the overall trend. It is likely that invasion risk for species capable of being trans-
ported by sea from these regions has increased substantially, and as such biosecurity managers
and policy makers should ensure that the distribution of biosecurity effort has changed in line
with these changing physical transport patterns and associated risks.
By considering this physical network purely in terms of flights and shipping, we are
abstracting away from the specific consideration of particular invasion pathways: intentional
transport (including illicit smuggling), unintentional live stowaways, or introduction alongside
a commodity. Each of these pathways is going to have different interactions with physical
transport mechanisms, with factors such as voyage duration, environmental conditions
throughout the voyage, and biosecurity controls each playing an important role. For example,
unintentional stowaways or accidental introduction alongside a commodity are perhaps most
likely to be associated with shipping traffic or cargo flights, given that all passenger flights into
Australia have strict controls to prevent the transport of stowaways such as insects. Intentional
transport, however, appears to be primarily mediated through air transport in Australia, likely
due to the shorter duration of journeys, with many recorded incidences of wildlife smuggling
detected by customs officers at Airports [38].
The two highest risk regions, Singapore and the North Island of New Zealand, provide con-
trasting examples of biosecurity risk. Singapore is a global hub for both air and sea traffic,
being both the world’s busiest port by arrival tonnage [39] and being the 11th highest air pas-
senger traffic country in 2013 (OAG) despite being only a single city with a relatively small
population. In contrast, New Zealand is a regional trade partner with Australia, with similar
agricultural and horticultural industries. A recent example of an alien species intercepted from
New Zealand is the tomato-potato psyllid, intercepted twice between 2009–2012 alongside
fruit, vegetable and nursery stock [40]. The psyllid is associated with Zebra chip disease, first
confirmed in New Zealand in 2008 having previously been detected in the US. While both Sin-
gapore and New Zealand are the source of historically recorded alien species (e.g., [31]), inter-
cepted as illegal imports or stowaways, they do not stand out as the most significant regions,
and in particular New Zealand is the source of relatively few alien interceptions. And more gen-
erally it is important to note that future invasion patterns may not necessarily align with past
invasion patterns. For example, many species established as invasive in Australia and globally
were introduced by acclimatisation societies in the 19th and early 20th centuries [41], a path-
way that no longer exists given changes in social attitudes. However, despite the end of this
practice, vertebrate invasions are ongoing and indeed increasing globally [9, 41].
There are a number of reasons why these regions with high physical connectedness are not
those that present the highest realised invasion risk. Singapore is geographically small and
highly urbanized, as such it is highly unlikely that any alien species transported from Singapore
are native. Cargo entering Australia from Singapore has likely undergone multiple stages of
biosecurity processing prior to entry. Instead, one of the most pertinent biosecurity risks pre-
sented by Singapore is in the global spread of emerging infectious diseases via international air
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passenger traffic, due to the combination of strong connectedness between countries within
south east Asia alongside a multitude of intercontinental connections [42]. In contrast, New
Zealand is relatively geographically remote and is not a global transport hub. Given this, the
greatest biosecurity risks presented by New Zealand are likely the transport of pests or diseases
capable of disrupting agriculture. Any alien species arriving from New Zealand are likely to be
established within New Zealand (alien or native) before subsequent transport to Australia.
However, New Zealand has perhaps the most comprehensive biosecurity policy approach in
the world [30], including an emphasis on pest-free export, and as such the transport of pests or
diseases from New Zealand is much less likely than from countries with less stringent biosecu-
rity controls. This may provide an opportunity for the use of pre-approval or measures directed
towards cost-effective assignment of biosecurity effort.
The approach taken here rests on a number of key assumptions. First, we assumed that the
relative risk of a flight or voyage transporting an alien species was independent of the source or
destination region, or any other factors, and thus that transport risk relates only to the number
of flights or voyages. It is conceivable, and indeed highly likely, that different source regions
could provide differing baseline transport risk profiles, perhaps due to customs regulations
imposed on vessels departing that region, or due to higher or lower availability of alien species
to be transported (either native to the region in question, or due to transport/trade hubs). Fur-
ther, the ability of a transported species to survive at its destination likely depends on environ-
mental conditions, i.e., if conditions are similar between the source and destination. As such,
this framework quantifying physical connectedness between regions should be analysed care-
fully alongside additional models and data relevant to the biosecurity context of interest.
Secondly, ships and flights were generally recorded as originating from their last port of call.
In practice, planes or ships themselves, or the transported passengers or cargo, can commence
their journey at a previous port of call, potentially taking on alien species at each port visited.
In some cases, particularly for air traffic, flights with multiple stops before arriving into Austra-
lia are all covered by a single flight number and as such users of the online tool may consider
these flights as spread over their whole path rather than restricted to the last port of call. But
these data do not cover cases where passengers may have travelled via a host country on flights
that do not share a flight number, or for the initial source of cargo or ships that arrived via an
intermediate destination. When long-term data are available detailing the travel histories of
ships or cargo (e.g., [22]), it might be possible for a future study to investigate in detail the
potential origins of the transport of alien species. However, in this study we restrict our analysis
to direct physical connectedness between regions, a more flexible approach relevant in a range
of biosecurity contexts.
Air traffic and sea traffic have many different characteristics that may contribute to trans-
port risk. One of the clearest differences is in travel time: a journey, e.g., Singapore to Mel-
bourne, that takes less than 8 hours by air may take c. 15 days by sea. A species capable of
surviving 8 hours on a plane but not 15 days on a ship, for example, would thus be more likely
to be introduced by air. This should contribute to the choice of weightings assigned to each
traffic type. However, this does not mean that air traffic is always going to be the highest risk
pathway, as other species may be able to survive a seaborne journey, or be transported along-
side commodities that travel by ship. Weightings should be chosen carefully, taking into
account any factors relevant to the situation.
Finally, since Australia is an island nation, international physical transport network path-
ways are limited to air and sea based transport. If an analysis along these lines was to be consid-
ered elsewhere, it may be necessary to consider land-based dispersal as an additional potential
pathway [7].
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The introduction and establishment of alien species presents significant economic and envi-
ronmental costs worldwide. In this study, we have described a framework to quantify the physi-
cal connectedness between geopolitical regions, with Australia as a case study, based on
weightings that can be chosen to suit pathways of interest. We have highlighted the source
regions with the highest physical connectedness to Australia: the North Island of New Zealand,
and Singapore. These data provide a baseline model for the transport of alien species, and
more broadly of transport of individuals and commodities into Australia and associated biose-
curity risks. We envisage that this framework should be a valuable tool for biosecurity policy-
makers, and provides an example of a approach that could be applied for other networks
worldwide.
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